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1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Revealed Preference methods offer an elegant and unambiguous way of testing
whether a set of observations on consumption could have been generated by a sin-
gle utility maximizing consumer. The test was originally developed by Afriat (1967).
Varian (1982) showed that his Generalized Axiom of Revealed Preference (garp) is
equivalent to Afriat’s condition of cyclic consistency. Consistency with garp can be
tested very easily.
If a consumer’s decisions are inconsistent with garp we might want to have an
idea of how severe this violation of utility maximization is. Alternatively, we would
like to have a test for “almost optimizing” behavior. One such measure is the Afriat
efficiency index (aei, Afriat 1972), which is widely used.
W ep r o p o s ean e wm e a s u r eb a s e do nt h ee x t e n tt ow h i c ht h eu p p e rb o u n do ft h e
indifference surface of a decision intersects the budget on which the decision was
made. The idea is to use preference relations that are implicit in a set of observations
toconstructthesetofbundleswhicharerevealedpreferredtoaconsumptionchoice.
The boundary of this set can be interpreted as an upper bound for the indifference
surface. If the data violate garp, some of these sets will intersect the budget hyper-
planeonwhichthechoicewasmade. Wethencomputethearea(orvolumeinhigher
dimensions) of the intersection of the revealed preferred set and the budget.
We also suggest a procedure to decide whether or not to treat a consumer who
violates garp as “close enough” to utility maximization. It is based on the reduction
ofthepowerthetesthasagainstrandombehavior. Whentestingthisprocedurewith
a set of utility maximizing decisions with added stochastic error, our new geometric
measure performs very well compared to the aei.
The remainder is organized as follows: Section 2 first briefly summarizes the re-
vealed preference approach and the aei. The new geometric measure is introduced
and a procedure to decide whether a set of observations should be accepted as util-
ity maximizing is suggested. Section 3 describes the procedure in more detail and
compares the new measure and its performance with the aei. In Section 4 the new
measure is applied to experimental data from Andreoni and Miller (2002). Section
5 discusses the advantages and disadvantages of the new measure and concludes.A Geometric Measure for the Violation of Utility Maximization 5
2Th e o r y
2.1 Preparations
The following notation is used: For all x, y ∈ Rℓ we write x ≥ y for xi ≥ yi for all
i, x > y for xi ≥ yi and x ≠ y for all i,a n dx ≫ y for xi > yi for all i. We denote
Rℓ
+ ={ x ∈ Rℓ ∶ x ≥ 0} and Rℓ
++ ={ x ∈ Rℓ ∶ x ≫ 0}.
A set of observed consumption choices consists of a set of chosen bundles of
commodities and the prices and incomes at which these bundles were chosen. Let
X = Rℓ
+ be the commodity space, where ℓ ≥ 2 denotes the number of different
commodities. The price space is P = Rℓ
++, and the space of price-income vectors
is P ×R++. Consumers choose bundles xi =( xi
1,...,xi
ℓ)′ ∈ X when facing a price
vector pi =(pi
1,...,pi
ℓ)∈P a nda ninco mewi ∈ R++. Abudgetsetisthendefinedby
Bi = B(pi,wi)={ x ∈ X ∶ pixi ≤ wi}. Theentiresetof n observations ona consumer
is denoted as S ={ ( xi,Bi)}n
i=1.
A utility function u(x) rationalizes a set of observations S if u(xi)≥u(x) for all
x such that pixi ≥ pix for all i = 1,...,n.
The following definitions are needed to recover consumer preferences that are
implicit in a set of consumption choices:
An observation xi is
(1) directly revealed preferred to x,w r i t t e nxiR0x,i fpixi ≥ pix;
(2) revealed preferred to x,w r i t t e nxiR∗x,i fe i t h e rxiR0x or for some sequence of
bundles(xj, xk,...,xm)suchthat xiR0xj, xjR0xk,...,xmR0x. Inthiscase R∗ isthe
transitive closure of the relation R0.
(3) strictly directly revealed preferred to x,w r i t t e nxiP0x,i fpixi > pix.
For consistency with the maximization of a piecewise linear utility function, Var-
ian (1982) introduced the following condition: The set of observations S satisfies the
Generalized Axiom of Revealed Preference (garp)ifxiR∗xj does not imply xjP0xi.
It can then be shown (Afriat 1967, Varian 1982) that if the data satisfies garp
thenthereexistsaconcave,monotonic,continuous,non-satiatedutilityfunctionthat
rationalizes the data.A Geometric Measure for the Violation of Utility Maximization 6
The set of bundles that are revealed preferred to a certain bundle x0 (which does
not have to be an observed choice) is given by the convex monotonic hull of all
choicesrevealedpreferredtox0. Theinterioroftheconvexmonotonichullisusedto
compute an approximate overcompensation function by Varian (1982). Knoblauch
(1992)showsthatthesetofbundlesrevealedpreferredto x0,denoted RP(x0),isj us t
the convex monotonic hull of all bundles in S that are revealed preferred to x0:
RP(x0) = Hconvex({x ∈ X ∶ x ≥ xi such that xiR∗x0 for some i = 1,...,n}), (1)











Several goodness-of-fit measures have been proposed. Possibly the most popular
measurefortheseverityofaviolationistheAfriatefficiencyindex(aei)duetoAfriat
(1972). Reporting the aei has become a standard at least for experimental studies.1
Toobtaintheaei,budgetsareshiftedtowardstheoriginuntilasetofobservationsis
consistentwithgarp.Lete beanumberbetween0and1. Definetherelation R0(e)
to be xiR0(e)xj if and only if epixi ≥ pix, and let R∗(e) be the transitive closure of
R0(e). Define GARP(e) as
GARP(e)⇔ If xiR∗(e)xj does not imply epjxj > pjxi.
Then the aei is the largest number such that GARP(e) is satisfied.
OthermeasuresincludeVarian’s(1985)minimumperturbationtest,basedonthe
minimal movements of the data needed to accept the null hypothesis of utility max-
imization; Famulari’s (1995) violation rate, which is the proportion of combinations
that form violations among observations for which violations can be expected; and
comparison of the observed number of violations with the maximum number of
1See, for example, Sippel (1997), Mattei (2000), Harbaugh et al. (2001), Andreoni and Miller

















Figure 1: Left: Two observations which violate garp. The shaded area gives the set of all bundles
revealed preferred to x1 and x2. Since x1 and x2 form a preference cycle the sets are necessarily
identical. Right: The intersection of RP(x1) with the budget line AB on which x1 was chosen. Note
that the maximal possible area of intersection is the area of ABCA.
violations possible, as applied by Swofford and Whitney (1987) and McMillan and
Amoako-Tuffou (1988). See Gross (1995) for a survey of measures and his own test,
which is based on an estimate of wasted expenditure.
2.3 The New Measure
Obviously, if a consumer makes decisions that are incompatible with garp, then at
leastforonechoicetheindifferencecurvethroughthatpoint,asimpliedbytheother
choices, intersects the budget line he made the choice on.2 The idea of our measure
i st oa s k ,“ h o wm u c ho fag i v e nb u d g e td i dac o n s u m e rr e v e a lt op r e f e rt ot h ea c t u a l
choicehemadeonthebudget?”. Toanswerthequestion, wetaketheupperboundof
the indifference curve through a choice xi a n dc o m p u t et h ea r e ab e t w e e nt h a tc u rv e
a n dth eb u d g e tl i n e .Th a ti st osa y ,w ec o m p u t eth ea r eao fth ei n t e r secti o no fth etw o
sets Bi and RP(xi). This basic idea is illustrated in Figure 1 and 2.
2Note that for illustrative purposes, we occasionally use terms only applicable to the two dimen-





Figure 2: Both{x′,x} and {x′′,x} lead to the same Afriat efficiency index of 1 - ε, but have different
volume violation indices.
The “size” of an intersection of Bi and RP(xi) is an area in two dimensions,
and a volume in three dimensions. For simplicity, the generalization to arbitrary
dimensions (the “hypervolume”) will be also be called volume3 and denoted by
vol(Polytope). For example, the volume of an ℓ-dimensional hypercube h with edge
length a is vol(h)=aℓ.
Denote the volume of the intersection of a budget Bi and all bundles revealed
preferred to xi by
V(xi)=vol(RP(xi)∩Bi). (2)
Obviously, if S satisfies garp, V(xi)=0 for all i = 1,...,n.
To compare the extent of violation of garp between many consumers who all
made decisions on the same budgets, V(xi) d o e sn o th a v et ob ea d j u s t e d .H o w e v e r ,
if consumers made decisions on different budgets, the magnitude of V(xi) can be
misleading. We therefore normalize the volume in the following way:
3The generalization of an area or volume to higher dimensions is also known as the content.S e e
Weisstein (2008).A Geometric Measure for the Violation of Utility Maximization 9






maxVi = vol(Hconvex({x ∈ X ∶ pix ≤ wi, pjx = wj ∀ j ∈{ 1,...,n}−{i}})).
Given the V(xi), we would like an index that aggregates the different intersec-








an index using the mean of all V(xi).B e c a u s eVm is bound between 0 and 1, we can
define the volume efficiency index (vei)as
VEI = 1−VImean (5)
In two dimensions, computation is fairly simply. For higher dimensions, we use
the program qhull, which implements the quick hull algorithm for convex hulls (see
Barber et al. 1996).
2.4 Power against Random Behavior
Dependingonthecharacteristicofthebudgetsets,thechanceofviolatinggarp can
differ substantially. A completely rational consumer will always be consistent and is
notin“danger”ofviolatinggarp. However,evenaconsumerwhomakespurelyran-
dom decision has a chance to satisfy garp. Bronars (1987) suggests a Monte Carlo
approach to determine the power the test has against random behavior. The approx-
imate power of the test is the percentage of random choices which violated garp.
Bronars’firstalgorithmfollowsBecker’s(1962)examplebyinducingauniformdistri-
4Another option is to take the maximal of all V(xi),o rt h em e d i a n .Th er e s u l t sa r er o b u s tw i t h
r e s p e c tt ot h ea g g r e g a t i o nm e t h o d .A Geometric Measure for the Violation of Utility Maximization 10
bution across the budget hyperplane. Using Bronars’ second algorithm, the random
choicesaregeneratedbydrawingℓi.i.duniformrandomvariables,z1,...,zℓ,foreach
price vector, and calculate budget shares Shi = zi/∑
ℓ
j=1zj. The random demand for
commodity xi is then calculated as xi =( Shi w)/pi.
One way to utilize Bronars’ power is to compute it based on a range of values
for an index that measures the severity of the violations, i.e. the power of the test is
the percentage of random choices which do “worse” than the value of the index. For
example, for an vei or aei of .9, compute the percentage of random choices which
h a v eaveio raeil o w e rt h a n. 9 .Th i sw i l lg i v ea ni d e ao fh o wm u c hp o w e rt h et e s t
loses if we allow consumers to deviate from optimizing behavior. See Section 3 for
details.
2.5 Theoretical Considerations
In Section 3 we will evaluate the new measure based on Monte-Carlo experiments.
However, it should already be pointed out that while the new measure is quite in-
tuitive, it has a theoretical shortcoming. The aei can be related to wasted absolute
income, which is a real magnitude. The volume efficiency index is related to the frac-
tionofthebudgetwhichispreferredtotheactualdecision,andputsequalweighton
fractions of the same volume. Neither does it tell us anything about wasted income,
n o rd o e si ts a ym u c ha b o u tw a s t e du t i l i t y .
Consider Figure 2. If we move x j u s tab i tu p w a r d so nt h es t e e p e ro ft h et w ob u d -
get lines we can find a utility function that rationalizes {x,x′} and {x,x′′}.S u p p o s e
that the data was collected with a small measurement error and that the consumer’s
actual decision was indeed a bit to the upper left of the observation x. While the
aeiis1(or1−ε) and raises little concern about the rationality of the consumer, the
vei suggests a small but substantial deviation from utility maximization if the data
is {x,x′} a n dar e l a t i v e l yl a r g ed e v i a t i o ni ft h ed a t ai s{x,x′′}.
To understand this unrobust behavior of the volume efficiency index, note that
thesetofobservations{x,x′}or{x,x′′}onlyimpliesthattheshadedareaisrevealed
preferred to x, but nothing can be said about how much it is preferred. Consider Fig-











ity level could have been a lot higher. Right: The set {x1,x2} does not satisfy homotheticity, because
tx2 w o u l dt h e nb es t r i c t l yp r e f e r r e dt ox1. Observations with measurement error are less likely to
cause a low volume efficiency index if the underlying preferences are homothetic.
Figure 2. Suppose the two indifference curves represent utility levels which, in abso-
lute terms, are only marginally different. Then no bundle in the part of the budget
w h i c hi sp r e f e r r e dt ox in Figure 2 adds much utility to x.
Based on these considerations we can expect the volume efficiency index to be
more robust if the underlying preferences are homothetic or “almost” homothetic.
In the diagram on the bottom of Figure 3 the bundle x2 is projected on budget 1.
Homotheticity implies that tx2 is preferred over all bundles to the right of tx2 on
budget 1, so the actual decision made on budget 1 would have to be on the left of
tx2. This implies that if we measure decisions of a homothetic consumer with some
measurement error or slight failures in the maximization process it is unlikely that
we observe a decision pattern as the one depicted in Figure 2.
Notwithstanding these theoretical concerns, the results of the Monte-Carlo ex-
perimentsinthenextsectionimplythatthevolumeefficiencyindexcanbeusefulin
applications.A Geometric Measure for the Violation of Utility Maximization 12
3 Comparison: Power Against Random Behavior
3.1 Procedure
Varian (1990), perhaps in a somewhat playful manner, suggests a 95% Afriat effi-
ciency level as the critical value to decide which garp-violating sets of observations
to accept as utility maximizing, “for sentimental reasons”. There is, however, no nat-
ural critical value, and the aei can be difficult to interprete without a reference. We
therefore suggest to generate random choices on the budget sets and to recompute
Bronars’ power for all efficiency levels between 0 and 1. This will give us an idea
of how much power the test loses if we accept garp-violating observations as close
enoughtoutilitymaximizing. Thisprocedurealsoallowsustocomparetheaei with
thevei.
To evaluate the two indices, we take data from known generating functions and
add stochastic error to simulate measurement error. Ideally, we would like to accept
all of the thusly obtained sets as utility maximizing without thereby reducing the
power of the applied test.
WeuseasimilarprocedureasappliedinFleissigandWhitney(2003,2005). First,
wegeneratedatafromafivecommodityutilityfunction. ThefirstfunctionisaCobb-










αi = 1 (6)
















βi = 1 (7)
FortheCobb-Douglasutilityfunctionweuseasetoffixedparameterstakenfrom
Fleissig and Whitney (2003):
α ∶ α1 = .4, α2 = .3, α3 = .15, α4 = .1, α5 = .05. (8)A Geometric Measure for the Violation of Utility Maximization 13
F o rt h ev e su t i l i t yf u n c t i o nw eu s eas e to ffi x e dp a r a m e t e r s ,w i t hαi as before
and
β ∶ β1 = .1, β2 = .3, β3 = .15, β4 = .3, β5 = .15 (9)
γ ∶ γ1 =− 3, γ2 = 2, γ3 = 0, γ4 =− 4, γ5 = 4 (10)
We repeat the computations for both functions with a different set of random
parameters each time by drawing each αi and each βi from a uniform distribution
U[.05,.95] and then normalizing it such that ∑
5
i=1 αi = ∑
5
i=1 βi = 1. We draw each γi
from a uniform distribution U[−5,5].
For the Monte-Carlo experiment we assume that we observe the demand accord-
i n gt ot h eg i v e nu t i l i t yf u n c t i o nw i t hs o m em e a s u r e m e n te r r o rt h a tfl u c t u a t e sb yκ%
around the true demand; we use {κ1,κ2,κ3}={ .05,.1,.2}.
The datasets have n1 = 20 observations each, repeated with n2 = 40, with expen-
diture w drawn from a uniform distribution W ∼ U[10000,12000]. Price vectors
aredrawnfromauniformdistributionP1 ∼ U[95,100]. Thesamestepsarerepeated
w i t had i s t r i b u t i o nP2 ∼ U[90,100]. These expenditures and prices lead to many
intersections of budget sets which can lead to many violations of garp.
To summarize, we use 48 different settings, each one being an element of
{cd,ves}×{fixed,random parameters}×{κ1,κ2,κ3}×{n1,n2}×{P1,P2}.
The data are generated by the following steps:
A1 Randomly draw n ∈{ n1,n2} expenditure observations from a uniform distribu-
tion W and n price vectors for which each element is drawn from a uniform
distribution P ∈{ P1,P2}.
A2 Generate utility maximizing demand for each budget, using the respective func-
tional form and set of parameters. Denote the maximizing decisions x∗
i for
i = 1,...,5.
A3 Generate demands with measurement error by multiplying x∗
1 ,...,x∗
5 by a uni-
form random number, so that xi = x∗
i (1 + εi) for i = 1,...,5,whereεi ∼
U[−κ,κ] and κ ∈{ .05,.1,.2}. To keep expenditure constant, normalize the
xi by multiplying each with λ = w/(p⋅x).A Geometric Measure for the Violation of Utility Maximization 14
A4 Repeat steps A1 – A4 many times, say 10,000.
To approximate the power the garp test has if we allow deviations from utility
maximization, we need to generate random choices on the budget sets:
B1 Generate budgets as in step A1.
B2 Generate random choices on the budget sets of step B1, following Bronars’ first
and second algorithm: (1) Draw a random point SP from the 4-simplex us-
ing a simplex point picking algorithm. The random demand for commod-
ity xi is then calculated as xi =( SPi w)/pi. (2) Draw five i.i.d uniform ran-
dom variables, z1,...,z5, for each price vector, and calculate budget shares
Shi = zi/∑
5
i=1zj. The random demand for commodity xi is then calculated
as xi =( Shi w)/pi.
B3 Repeat steps B1 and B2 many times, at least as often as with A1 – A4, say 20,000.
The final step is to compute the loss of power of the test for all possible aei and
vei:
C1 Generate utility maximizing sets of observations with stochastic error, following
procedure A. Then for each set of n budgets, compute the aei and the vei.
C2 Generate sets of observations following procedure B. Again, compute the aei
a n dt h eveif o re a c hs e t .
C3 Sort the sets from C1 by their aei and vei, respectively. For each set from C1,
compute the percentage of sets from step C2 that have a higher aei and vei,














Table 1: Bronars’ Power of the used data sets.
Table 2 reports the fraction of choice sets generated by procedure A which are
inconsistent with garp. The choice of parameters does not seem to be important.
Whatisperhapsabitsurprisingisthatthefractionof garp-consistentsetsishigher
for the second utility function.
3.2.2 Loss of Power
Themainresultisthatforallofthedifferentdatasetswegenerated,thelossofpower
ismostlysmallerandnevergreaterifthecutoffpointisbasedonthevei ratherthan
the aei. Perhaps a bit surprisingly, the result is robust with respect to the functional
form. Itsuggeststhatthevei isbettersuitedthantheaei tocapturesmalldeviations
fromutilitymaximizationanddistinguishbetweenasetofdecisionsthatarecloseto
utility maximizing on the one hand and purely random behavior on the other hand.
For the sets with n2 = 40 budgets, the difference is less pronounced. This is not
surprisingbecausethepowerofthesetupforthesecasesisalreadyverycloseto100%;A Geometric Measure for the Violation of Utility Maximization 16
cobb-douglas function
fixed random
κ = .05 κ = .1 κ = .2 κ = .05 κ = .1 κ =. 2
n1
P1 3.43% 13.06% 31.45% 3.04% 12.19% 31.64%
P2 1.08% 11.50% 39.51% 1.08% 10.49% 39.39%
n2
P1 12.01% 41.03% 77.83% 12.37% 41.47% 77.99%
P2 4.77% 38.46% 86.58% 4.25% 35.39% 85.95%
ves function
fixed random
κ = .05 κ = .1 κ = .2 κ = .05 κ = .1 κ =. 2
n1
P1 1.35% 7.00% 20.70% 1.89% 7.09% 20.63%
P2 0.44% 4.82% 22.77% 0.39% 6.36% 31.88%
n2
P1 5.35% 25.97% 60.63% 7.01% 34.65% 74.25%
P2 1.49% 19.01% 65.84% 1.46% 23.27% 79.07%
Table 2: Fractions of garp-inconsistent choice sets.
the procedure used here is mainly useful for applications in which the test power is
less than perfect.
Figures 4 and 5 (on pages 20 and 21) report the proportion of utility maximiz-
ing observations with stochastic error that are accepted as “consistent enough” with
garp, depending on the desired power of the test (from the Cobb-Douglas func-
tion with fixed parameters, P1 and n1 = 20, using the random choices generated by
Bronars’ first and second algorithm, respectively). Figure 6 (on page 22) report the
same results for the ves function (Bronars’ second algorithm). In all cases, we lose
less test power when basing decisions on the aei.
Tables 3 and 4 report the retained test power when all utility maximizing choices
with stochastic error are accepted as utility maximizing, using Bronars’ first and sec-
ond algorithm, respectively. The tables only report the results for fixed parameters;
the results for random parameters are largely the same.A Geometric Measure for the Violation of Utility Maximization 17
cobb-douglas function
aei vei
κ = .05 κ = .1 κ = .2 κ = .05 κ = .1 κ =. 2
n1
P1 95.21% 91.88% 73.21% 96.56% 96.43% 94.83%
P2 99.53% 98.87% 92.37% 99.62% 99.61% 99.41%
n2
P1 99.98% 99.94% 98.41% 99.99% 99.99% 99.99%
P2 100.00% 100.00% 99.92% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
ves function
aei vei
κ = .05 κ = .1 κ = .2 κ = .05 κ = .1 κ =. 2
n1
P1 95.76% 93.04% 86.49% 96.57% 96.44% 95.88%
P2 99.58% 99.33% 96.46% 99.62% 99.62% 99.58%
n2
P1 99.99% 99.96% 99.82% 100.00% 100.00% 99.99%
P2 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
Table 3: The retained test power when all choices are accepted as utility maximizing, using Bronars’
first algorithm.
4 Application to Experimental Data
Andreoni and Miller (2002) report results of an experimental dictator game. It was
designed to test rationality of altruistic preferences. It is a generalized dictator game
inwhichonesubject(thedictator)allocatestokenendowmentsbetweenhimselfand
an anonymous other subject (the beneficiary) with different transfer rates. The pay-
offs of the dictator and the beneficiary are interpreted as two distinct goods, and the
transfer rates as the price ratio of these two goods.
Figure 7 (on page 23) reports the proportion of subjects which are accepted as
“consistent enough” with garp, depending on the desired power of the test, using
Bronars’ first algorithm (results are similar for the second algorithm). Contrary to
the results from Section 3, we lose somewhat less power if we base decisions on the
aei.A Geometric Measure for the Violation of Utility Maximization 18
cobb-douglas function
aei vei
κ = .05 κ = .1 κ = .2 κ = .05 κ = .1 κ =. 2
n1
P1 87.66% 78.66% 44.27% 90.75% 90.20% 82.98%
P2 97.66% 94.16% 71.32% 98.22% 98.10% 96.30%
n2
P1 99.92% 99.35% 83.40% 99.98% 99.97% 99.91%
P2 99.99% 99.99% 97.50% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
ves function
aei vei
κ = .05 κ = .1 κ = .2 κ = .05 κ = .1 κ =. 2
n1
P1 88.76% 81.82% 66.80% 90.79% 90.28% 88.04%
P2 97.95% 96.63% 84.49% 98.22% 98.20% 97.73%
n2
P1 99.97% 99.70% 97.89% 99.98% 99.97% 99.97%
P2 99.99% 99.99% 99.89% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
Table 4: The retained test power when all choices are accepted as utility maximizing, using Bronars’
second algorithm.
Interpretation of this result is not straightforward. First note that the data set
is too small to draw strong conclusions, as there were 142 subjects of which only
13 violated garp. Secondly, we do not know for sure whether these 13 subjects are
actuallyutilitymaximizerswhomadeonlyminorerrors. Comparingtheresultswith
t h er e s u l t sf r o mt h ep r e v i o u ss e c t i o ns u g g e s t st h a tt h ed a t af r o mt h es u b j e c t sw h o
violated garp is indeed not so much a result of imperfect utility maximization but
rather random behavior. Another possible explanation is that even the ves utility
function used to generate data in the previous sections is still a bit too idealized.A Geometric Measure for the Violation of Utility Maximization 19
5 Discussion and Conclusion
In this paper a new measure for the severity of a violation of utility maximization,
the volume efficiency index, was suggested. The measure is based on the extent to
whichtheupperboundoftheindifferencesurfaceofadecisionintersectsthebudget
on which the decision was made. This measure has several advantages.
The measure is intuitively appealing as it can be easily illustrated with graphical
tools covered in any intermediate course in microeconomic theory. In two dimen-
sions the measure is easy to compute. It provides a convenient way of relating the
extent of a violation to the maximum extent possible. It performs very well as a cut-
off rule for determining whether or not observations on a single consumer can still
be considered “close enough” to maximizing behavior.
A disadvantage is the computational effort needed to compute the measure in
high dimensions.5 However, note that the dimension of most data obtained by labo-
ratory experiments is naturally bounded.
5FromexperimentationwithsimulateddataitseemsthatevenMonteCarloexperimentsarestill
quite feasible in six dimensions and 40 observation points per consumer; in fact, it takes about as
much time as computing the aei.A Geometric Measure for the Violation of Utility Maximization 20


























Figure 4: Results for the Cobb-Douglas function, using P1, n1, fixed parameters, Bronars’ first al-
gorithm. Top: κ = .05, middle: κ = .1, bottom: κ = .2. The figure reports the proportion of utility
maximizingobservationsthatareacceptedasconsistentwithgarp,dependingonthedesiredpower
of the test. The dashed line gives the proportion of accepted observations according to the aei, and
the solid line gives the proportion according to the vei.A Geometric Measure for the Violation of Utility Maximization 21




























Figure 5: Same as for Figure 4, but using Bronars’ second algorithm.A Geometric Measure for the Violation of Utility Maximization 22

























Figure 6: Same as for Figure 5, but for ves function.A Geometric Measure for the Violation of Utility Maximization 23











Figure 7: Results for data from Andreoni and Miller (2002) with Bronars’ first algorithm. The fig-
ure reports the proportion of utility maximizing observations that are accepted as consistent with
garp, depending on the desired power of the test. The dashed line gives the proportion of accepted
observations according to the aei, and the solid line gives the proportion according to the vei.A Geometric Measure for the Violation of Utility Maximization 24
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